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Premier League
Over 6 matches, Manchester United create most danger down their right (1.38× the league norm), and concede most down their left (1.41×).
Manchester United, 2026/27, 124 shots in the final 35m, 8 scored.
vs league average, 1.00 marked, share of xG
Manchester United spend more time than most in the final twenty yards, but turn less of that territory into danger.
10.7 deep completions a match
4.5 conceded a match
11.8 opponent passes per defensive action
13.9 of their own passes allowed
0.167 npxG per deep completion
A deep completion is a pass finished within about twenty yards of goal, and PPDA counts an opponent’s passes per defensive action. A lower figure is a harder press, so the bar inverts it to keep every row reading the same way. This describes where the ball ends up rather than how it travelled: no pass or carry record exists in this data, so progressive passes and carries are genuinely out of reach rather than merely absent.
Manchester United concede more down their left: more attacks there, and better ones.
Shots on the weak flank per shot on the strong one
xG per shot on the weak flank versus the strong one
Set pieces are excluded, since a corner has no flank. Sides within ten points of an even split are treated as level, since a season is short enough that smaller gaps are usually noise.
Manchester United take 20% of their open-play danger from crosses and 18% from balls played through the middle.
Measured from the action immediately before each shot. This shows whether a side works the ball wide or through the middle; which flank they progress down cannot be derived, because no free source publishes pass locations.
Manchester United’s attacking involvement is effectively 8.1 players. A side spread across fourteen absorbs an absence that one built on nine does not.
17.2% of their attacking involvement is doubtful or out. Kobbie Mainoo, Patrick Dorgu, Luke Shaw, Benjamin Sesko.
Share of the squad’s non-penalty xG, plus expected assists, plus half the build-up value of its midfielders and forwards — what a player finished, what they created, and half of what they moved. Involvement rather than chances: build-up credits every player in a possession, so this says how much of the attack runs through someone, not what fraction of the chances were theirs. Defenders are left out of that half deliberately, because build-up rewards whoever starts a possession and counting it for everybody found centre-backs rather than ball-carriers. The half itself is a judgement, not a measurement: weighting it properly needs per-match lineups, and those begin this season. Penalties are left out because they describe who the club nominates rather than who creates. Contributors under 2% are not listed, though they still count towards the spread above.
Manchester United’s defensive work is effectively 11.2 players. A side spread across fourteen absorbs an absence that one built on nine does not.
27.0% of their defensive work is doubtful or out. Kobbie Mainoo, Luke Shaw, Patrick Dorgu.
Share of the squad’s defensive contribution: tackles, blocks, clearances, interceptions and recoveries combined. Goalkeepers record none of it, so a keeper never appears here however much the side depends on him. This statistic begins in 2025/26, so there is no earlier season to compare against.
The pass immediately before the shot, so a player who starts moves without playing the final ball will not appear here. Roughly seven in ten shots name their creator.
Manchester United produce most of their danger with the game level (45% of their xG).
The scoreline at the moment each shot was struck, rebuilt from goal times. Sides that trail often will look busier in attack than they really are.
